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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, I explore the challenges to and reasons for the current limited 
trilateral security cooperation among Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in the 
Celebes Sea.  This study analyzes historical and current events among these countries and 
relations between them and extraregional powers. In particular, it examines their 
unilateral and bilateral policies, their domestic political constraints, and the status of their 
respective militaries and domestic law enforcement institutions. These nations have been 
successful in establishing trinational agreements among each other to enhance security 
cooperation in the Celebes Sea, however these have lacked sufficient scope and depth to 
address the current terrorist and piracy threats in the Celebes Sea region. I find that this 
lack of security cooperation is mainly due to these nations’ historical mistrust of each 
other’s national interests, domestic political challenges and limited force projection and 
interagency capabilities. In this thesis I make recommendations for U.S. policy and 
theater engagement planning in these nations. 
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This thesis will explore the present status and prospects for future security 
cooperation among Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in the Celebes Sea and its 
adjacent coastal regions. I will attempt to identify and describe the nature of security 
cooperation among Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, address major threats in the 
Celebes Sea and how to improve it. I will explain why the current security cooperation 
among these three nations is limited in form, scope, intensity and duration.  
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have been able to cooperate politically 
and economically via international and regional organizations as well as through bilateral 
agreements. These nations have also collaborated in regional security, however this has 
not developed to the same extent as their economic and political cooperation. Doing this 
analysis may provide the foundation needed to predict these nations’ future actions and 
formulate recommendations regarding U.S. policy in the region. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Security cooperation in the Celebes Sea region among Indonesia, Malaysia and 
the Philippines is essential for their own security and for the safe passage of international 
trade. Ian Storey labeled the Celebes Sea’s triborder area as the “danger zone of 
Southeast Asia,” due to cross-border activities of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), these organizations are 
involved in crime, terrorism and piracy among many other illicit activities.1  These 
organizations are capable of coordinating activities and executing operations across 
borders with fellow terrorists. The governments have found growing evidence of their 
ability to orchestrate combined operations such as the four suspects who were 
 
                                                 
1 Ian Storey, “Triborder Sea is SE Asian Danger Zone,” Asia Times, October 18, 2007. 
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apprehended for their involvement in the bombings of February 14, 2005 in the 
Philippines. Among the detained were two JI Indonesians, one Malaysian and a 
Philippine member of the ASG.2   
Southeast Asia plays a significant role in the world’s trade, transport and security 
interests due to its geography. More than half of the global maritime trade travels through 
Southeast Asia, predominantly through the Strait of Malacca due to location and 
established navigational aides.3 However, the Lombok-Makassar passage which leads to 
the Celebes Sea is one of the only bodies of water in the area capable of supporting 
submarines and supertankers, making this passage important for world trade and energy 
commerce.4 On June 6, 2007, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence published the 
Worldwide Threat to Shipping Mariner Information message which included reports of 
piracy activities throughout the globe. Of the eleven listed piracy-related events reported 
in Southeast Asia, three took place in the Celebes Sea and surrounding straits. A fourth 
incident took place in the Sulu Sea, an adjacent maritime throughway where the same 
groups engage in terrorist and piracy activities.5 
The disruption of this maritime region and its routes could inflict a significant 
blow to the world economy and the political stability of the U.S. and its allies. 
Cooperation among these three nations in securing the Celebes Sea and adjacent straits 
would not only reduce terrorism, pirate activity and related markets in the area, but 
furthermore reinforce the porous maritime and insular borders of these nations.  
Security cooperation among Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines would 
increase central government presence in this sea and their adjacent land masses which 
                                                 
2 Stephen Ulph, “Evidence of Jemaah Islamiyah Expansion in the Philippines,” Terrorism Focus 2, 
no.5 (March 2003): 1. 
3 Leif Rosenberger, Shipping and Commerce, Camp Smith: US Pacific Command, 2002. 
4 Ji Guoxing, “SLOC security in the Asia Pacific,” Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, February 
2000. 
 5 “Worldwide Threat to Shipping Mariner Information,” Office of Naval Intelligence, 
http://www.nga.mil/MSISiteContent/StaticFiles/MISC/wwtts/wwtts_2007%200606100000.txt (accessed 
April 1, 2008). 
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have been labeled as ungoverned spaces by the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense.6 
The limited government presence in the islands surrounding the Celebes Sea provides a 
niche for piracy and terrorism to flourish. These territories are far from their respective 
nations’ capitals and this distance has contributed to their governments’ inability to 
successfully control these islands and establish security. The current lack of infrastructure 
and rugged topography of the bordering islands of Sulawesi, Mindanao and Borneo 
provide the perfect terrain for insurgent and criminal groups to sustain their activities 
without fear of government detection or prosecution.7  
These nations’ weak organizational structures, limited resources and different 
capabilities pose challenges to successful security cooperation in the Celebes Sea. U.S. 
sponsorship for multilateral security cooperation faces other challenges due to these 
nations’ fears of a super power manipulating its weaker allies as well as mistrust of U.S. 










                                                 
6 Stew Magnuson, “Southeast Asia Struggles to Create Anti-Terrorism Network,” National Defense, 
June 2007. 
7 Angel Rabasa, Kim Cragin, Peter Chalk, Steven Boraz, Ungoverned Territories (Santa Monica: 
RAND Corporation, 2007), 3. 
8 Amitav Acharya,  “Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual 




Figure 1.   Illustration of the Celebes Sea and surrounding areas.9 
 
                                                 
9 “Southeast Asia Map,” Geographic Guide, http://www.asia-atlas.com/maps/southeast-asia.jpg 




1. Trilateral Security in the Celebes Sea 
Trilateral security in the Celebes Sea is jeopardized by a complex threat which 
affects Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Terrorist organizations have found safe 
havens in the surrounding islands of the Celebes Sea to recruit, train, operate and remain 
concealed. Many of these territories are hosts to ethnic and religious conflicts, a greater 
challenge for local authorities and providing a safe haven for these organizations to 
operate. Some of these organizations have adopted traditional pirate tactics to fund their 
operations and to carry out their agendas. Criminal piracy is also rampant in the region, 
affecting the livelihood of local communities and the safe transit of international 
commerce.   
The three nations have unilaterally attempted to combat this threat, however the 
terrain and remoteness of these archipelagic borders allow these groups to move easily 
from one country to another. These nations have engaged in bilateral efforts to control 
their common border areas, however the effectiveness of their forces, mistrust of each 
other’s intentions and corruption has limited these efforts. The failure of unilateral and 
trilateral approaches to these problems has prompted the three nations to reinitiate 
trilateral efforts to secure the areas surrounding the Celebes Sea. 
2. Nature of the Threat in the Celebes Sea 
The threats to regional peace and stability in the Celebes Sea are diverse and 
come from foreign and domestic groups. Terrorism and criminal piracy endanger the 
maritime lanes of the Celebes Sea which are the venues for critical commercial cargo 
transiting from the Indian to the Pacific Ocean. Cooperation among terrorist groups has 
been seen throughout the three nations as they share ideology, training, and assist each 
other in regional operations. In 2002, when the JI experienced a series of setbacks due to 
Indonesian counter terrorism actions, this terrorist group reached out to the ASG for 
shelter and joint training in Mindanao’s MILF camps.10 
                                                 
10 Zachary Abuza, Balik Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 
2005), 22. 
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In November of 2005, a study by the Merchant International Group predicted that 
Indonesian waters outside of the Malacca Strait would experience over 70 attacks to 
maritime shipping within one year.11 The study placed particular emphasis on the eastern 
coast of Borneo, classifying it as a lawless area where organized crime and corruption of 
government officials is rampant. The study also mentioned high risk areas such as the 
Malacca and Makassar straits, and Sulu Archipelago, the latter two being areas adjacent 
to the Celebes Sea. The Strait of Makassar is not heavily transited with the exception of 
crucial cargo which encounters difficulty in transiting the Strait of Malacca due to depth 
limitations.12 
Ethnic and religious conflicts around the Celebes Sea do not present a direct 
threat to trade in the region, however the disorder and chaos caused by the escalation of 
violence provide terrorists and criminals with a safe haven. In Sulawesi and the Maluku 
islands, historical religious division between Christians and Muslims maintain these 
islands in a state of tension and potential conflict. Following the exit of Suharto from 
power, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, and the anti Christian violence in Jakarta 
(1998) which left six Christian Ambonese dead, widespread violence erupted in the 
island of Ambon and quickly spread into the surrounding Malukan islands.13  
Another outbreak of violence in the late 1990s between armed religious factions 
drove the city of Poso, Sulawesi into chaos. This may have also been the result of a 
similar conflict in the Maluku archipelago spreading into the island or the outcome of the 
Muslim migrations from the rest of Indonesia into Sulawesi which reduced the 
proportions of the Christian population.14 The religious conflicts in these islands have 
produced ideal environments for radical organizations to recruit, hide and launch 
operations. 
                                                 
11 Thomas Turner,  “Piracy Risk is More Than Just the Malacca Strait: Wider Indonesian Waters Pose 
Even Greater Threat to World’s Shipping Says  MIG’s Model,” Lloyd’s List, November 1, 2005. 
12 Ji Guoxing, “SLOC security in the Asia Pacific,” Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, February 
2000. 
13 Gary Dean, “Ethno-Religious Conflict in Maluku,” Okusi, June 2000. 
14 Nicholas Nugent, “Analysis: Roots of Sulawesi Conflict.” BBC News, December 20, 2001, Asia-
Pacific, World. 
  7
3. Explanation for the Limited Trinational Security Cooperation in the 
Celebes Sea 
Several historical events among the three nations have caused mutual mistrust 
since their independence. During the 1950s, Indonesia experienced a series of revolts and 
secessionist movements across the archipelago which Malaysia, the United Kingdom and 
the United States supported. As the Sukarno regime reaffirmed control over the troubled 
islands, the Malaysian government offered asylum to the fleeing leadership of the 
Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic.15  In kind the Indonesian 
government supported and aided insurgency efforts in the Sultanate of Brunei and other 
opposition movements in Malaysian territory in 1962.16 
These events were followed by two near simultaneous hostile policies assumed by 
the Indonesian and Philippine governments against Malaysia. In 1962 the Government of 
the Philippines made a claim to the Malaysian province of Sabah as part of the Republic 
of the Philippines due to the historical background of the territory as part of the southern 
Sultanate of Sulu. In 1963, the government of Indonesia declared its “Konfrontasi” policy 
against Malaysia, which stemmed from Jakarta’s strong opposition to the creation of the 
Malaysian state due to its colonial nature and the former involvement of the British 







                                                 
15 Justus M. Van der Kroef, “Indonesia, Malaya, and the North Borneo Crisis,” Asian Survey 3, no.4 
(April 1963): 173-181. 
16 Ibid. 
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Tensions cooled after the Philippine claim became a lower priority and the 
Indonesian government renounced Konfrontasi, however this short-lived friendly period 
was followed by another wave of tensions. In 1968 the Manila press exposed the 
Philippine government’s “Corregidor Affair,” a plan to infiltrate Sabah with a special 
trained unit resulting in the massacre of the unit’s Muslim recruits.17 Thirty four years 
later Manila revived the claim as a response to Malaysia’s deportation of Overseas 
Filipino Workers (OFW).18 
Further impediments are due to the nations’ lack of resources to control the 
triborder region. These nations’ militaries are inadequate to simultaneously enforce the 
law and public order within conflicting regions and patrol maritime areas. Even when 
bilateral operations take place, they do not have enough depth to effectively employ 
combined efforts in the region. USN Lieutenant John Bradford identified the frustration 
of some of the region’s naval officers, who express that many of the existing joint 
security operations along the neighboring Malacca Strait are reduced to formalities 
between vessels and schedule exchanges.19  
The Malaysian government identified equipment and information technology 
challenges as obstacles to armed forces effectiveness.20 Other challenges are corruption 
and inefficient interaction by domestic institutions. Ed McWilliams, former political 
counsel for the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, stated that the Indonesian military is a source of 
support for criminal and terrorist organizations such as Laskar Jihad.21 The International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report of 2006 mentions the lack of cooperation and 
                                                 
17 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2001), 
48-51. 
18 Joyce Pangco Pañares, “KL Crackdown on OFW Revives Sabah Claim.” Manila Standard Today, 
February 9, 2005. 
19 John Bradford, “The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” 
Naval War College Review 58, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 63-86. 
20 Mohd Zahidi Zainuddin, “Armed Forces Faces IT Challenge to Keep Abreast.” New Straits Times. 
September 19, 2000. 
21 “US funding for Indonesian Military Expected to Resume,” Judicial System Monitor Program, 
http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Indonesia/JakNews/29_01_03indonnewsjr03feb03.htm (accessed March 30, 
2008). 
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inefficiencies between the Philippine law enforcement and criminal justice systems as 
significant hurdles to the effective prosecution of criminals and terrorists.22 
4. New Surge of Trinational Security Cooperation 
These nations began showing greater inclination to cooperate against the existing 
threat shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the Bali bombings of 
October 12, 2002. In 2001, Philippine President Gloria Arroyo and Indonesia’s President 
Megawati Sukarnoputri discussed plans for greater bilateral security agreements while 
establishing new trade agreements. The discussions included the establishment of an 
aggressive combined response to maritime piracy and increased cooperation among the 
nations’ intelligence and security services.23 In 2005, the governments of Indonesia and 
the Philippines reached a four-point agreement, which included bilateral security 
cooperation. Current Indonesian President Yudhoyono explicitly addressed the necessity 
to safeguard the areas of North Sulawesi, Borneo, southern Mindanao and northern 
Maluku, which share the Celebes Sea.24 
Foreign power interests in the triborder region have added to the momentum of 
security cooperation in the region. In 2002, the governments of Australia and Malaysia 
agreed on bilateral efforts to combat terrorism in the region. This would allow law 
enforcement agencies from both nations to cooperate in the prosecution of terrorist 
groups through the sharing of intelligence, training and other education.  
In 2006, the Indonesian government approached Australia to establish more 
extensive bilateral maritime security cooperation.25 Some of the ideas discussed involved 
laying maritime beacon devices to facilitate the monitoring of maritime traffic between 
both nations. In the same year the U.S., Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and other 
                                                 
22 “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report of 2006,” School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 
http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/drugs/incsr2006/incsr_2006_the_philippines.html (accessed April 2, 2008). 
23 Robert Go, “Arroyo, Megawati Sign Deals and Discuss Security.” The Straits Times. November 13, 
2001. 
24 “Indonesia, Philippines Reach Four-Point Agreement.” BBC. June 22, 2005. 
25 “Indonesia Asks Australia to Consider All Aspects of Maritime Cooperation.” BBC. November 24, 
2006. 
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regional partners, held Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT), an 
annual maritime security exercise off the coast of Phuket, Thailand. This multilateral 
effort involved these nations’ naval forces responding to simulated piracy attacks on 
commercial configured vessels, presenting a realistic scenario for future operations.26 
ASEAN has also become a forum for security cooperation in region. Per the 
declaration of the ASEAN Concord II of 2003 (Bali Concord II), ASEAN is a community 
comprising the principles of political, security, economic and socio-cultural 
cooperation.27 This was later enhanced through the establishment of the ASEAN Defense 
Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), creating a forum for the region’s defense ministers to 
discuss security and defense issues. In May of 2006, the first ADMM was held in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia, where the nations’ representatives declared the establishment of the 
ADMM-Plus, a forum where ASEAN nations can address security issues with external 
nation partners.28 
5. Theories on Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia 
There are two schools of international relations theory which attempt to explain 
security cooperation in Southeast Asia, realism and constructivism. Realism bases its 
argument on independent states seeking self interested cooperation to ensure their own 
security. Constructivist theory approaches the debate by weighing more on these nations’ 
sense of community, common history and norms which have developed concepts such as 
the “ASEAN way.” Realism is better suited to explain this relationship during times of 





                                                 
26 Edward Baxter, “Button Sews Up Pacific Piracy Exercise,” Military Sealift Command, July 2006. 
27 “Declaration of ASEAN Concord II,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 
http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm  (accessed February 1, 2008). 
28 “ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-PLUS),” Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, http://www.aseansec.org/21216.pdf (accessed April 2, 2008). 
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better grounds during times of regional peace and prosperity. Both schools differ in their 
focus of study, realists employ state centric interests while constructivists adhere to a 
sense of regional identity.29  
According to Amitav Acharya, security cooperation in the third world after World 
War II was usually limited to a hegemonic and an autonomous model. Neither of these 
seemed to function in Southeast Asia mainly due to foreign powers’ emphasis on external 
threats as opposed to focusing on existing internal disputes among the members when 
attempting to unite these nations in various organizational frameworks.  Other challenges 
were due to these organizations’ weak structures, nations’ limited resources and different 
capabilities, the potentiality for the leading great power to manipulate its weaker allies 
and its inability to focus on the region.30   
Shortly after the Vietnam War the ASEAN nations adopted four principles for the 
establishment of a security community in the region: national and regional resilience 
based on economic, political and social stability, a non provocative attitude towards the 
Indochinese threat and the control of Great Power influence in the region.31 Challenges to 
a greater security community in the region are differences in capabilities and resource 
levels (as mentioned above) as well as differences in doctrine, materiel (Russian, Chinese 
or U.S.) and training levels.  
The establishment of ASEAN as a security community in the region has been 
successful as Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have refused violent means to intra 
regional dispute resolution, opting to engage diplomatically. However, Nicholas Khoo 
points out that these nations have sought external venues to resolve regional conflicts 
such as the Malaysian and Indonesian dispute over the Sipadan-Ligitan. This dispute was 
                                                 
29 N. Ganesan, “ ‘Mirror, mirror , on the wall’: misplaced polarities in the study of Southeast Asian 
security,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 3, (2003): 221-240.  
30 Amitav Acharya, “Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual 
Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN,” Journal of Peace Research 29, no. 1 (February 
1992): 7-21. 
31 Amitav Acharya, “The Association o Southeast Asian Nations: “Security Community” or “Defence 
Community”?,” Pacific Affairs 64, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 159-178. 
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taken to International Court of Justice rather than seeking a regional solution, reinforcing 
the undesired need for foreign intervention. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis is a case study of cooperation among Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines regarding their approach to security cooperation along their common border 
area of the Celebes Sea. The analyses will begin by studying the present threats to 
regional peace and stability in the Celebes Sea and the governments’ response. Particular 
consideration will be given to the historical tensions and conflicts among Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines to understand possible reasons for the present limitations in 
security cooperation. This will be followed by analysis of recent efforts by these three 
countries to increase trilateral and multilateral efforts in guaranteeing security along their 
borders, the Celebes Sea and is adjacent waterways. Finally, I will make 
recommendations for regional approach and U.S. involvement in this regional effort for 
US strategic, operational and tactical planners.   
The sources will include journals, books, and articles by experts on regional 
security, economic cooperation, and foreign and domestic policies adopted by these 
nations. Some of the articles and chapters studied focus on heightened conflicts in areas 
where the region’s governments are combating secessionist insurgencies or other 
government opposing movements. Other literature specializes in more peaceful 
engagements among these nations and external influences when addressing respective 
interests and goals of the region. 
The hypothesis is that these nations’ regional cooperation reaches boundaries due 
to conflicting national interests, including religious, ethnic, political and territorial 
disputes among them. For example, border disputes on the island of Borneo are still 
present, although not a current priority in these nations’ agendas. Christian-Muslim 
relations constitute major issues in Indonesia and the Philippines, with an impact on 




interrelations may be their attitude towards foreign intervention, as Malaysia and the 
Philippines welcome Western influence and presence (including military presence) while 
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II. NATURE OF THE THREAT 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Threats to regional peace and stability in the Celebes Sea are diverse and come 
from foreign and domestic sources. This body of water is surrounded by Indonesian, 
Malaysian and Philippine island territories where boundary enforcement is limited. As a 
result, terrorist organizations, pirates and peaceful civilians move across islands and land 
borders with minimal government restrictions.  
The colonial history of this area paved the path for today’s conflicts in the region 
of the Celebes Sea. Historical ethnic and religious differences among neighboring 
populations have contributed to conflicts among communities in Borneo, Maluku, 
Mindanao, Sulawesi and Sulu. Ethnic tensions as a result of Indonesian and Philippine 
programs of sponsored migrations have added another element of friction with the native 
populations in the region. This unrest and the governments’ limited presence in these 
remote lands have provided a haven for terrorist groups to operate and obtain refuge.  
The emergence of radical Islamic organizations with connections to the Middle 
East and Al Qaeda has complicated the threat. According to Mao Tse-Tung, for the “fish” 
to reproduce the environment has to be beneficial, the above mentioned ethnic and 
religious tensions have provided the warm waters for terrorist organizations to flourish. 
Some of these organizations have adopted piracy practices native to the region, 
establishing a lucrative business which provides these organizations with funds to sustain 
their operations. This terrorist and criminal piracy endangers the maritime lanes of the 
Celebes Sea which are the transit lanes for critical commercial cargo transiting from the 
Indian to the Pacific Oceans. In this chapter I will describe the main three threats found in 
the Celebes Sea and its coastal areas, and I will attempt to explain how foreign and 
domestic groups converge to complicate the security situation in the region.  
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B. TERRORIST GROUPS 
Terrorist groups in Southeast Asia emerged with the assistance of Middle Eastern 
organizations in the later part of the 20th century, following the independence of 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. While Indonesia and the Philippines 
experienced nationalist and Islamic movements throughout their colonial histories, some 
of these and Middle Eastern sponsored organizations gave way to new groups with the 
intent to purify Islam and return to a more literal style of religious practice. An example 
of one of these sponsors is the International Islamic Relief Organization, founded by 
Mohammad Jamal Khalifa (Osama Bin Laden’s brother in law) which established 
operations in the Philippines in 1988. This organization provided funds to the ASG to 
purchase weapons and fulfill other needs in support of their operations.32 Furthermore, 
the organization was involved in the support of radical Islamic groups throughout 
Southeast Asia where Muslims are oppressed by U.S. backed regimes.33  
This Middle East Islam connection and exposure became the recruiting channel 
for mujahedeen in conflicts during the Afghan Anti Soviet jihad, the Bosnia, Chechnya 
and Kashmir conflicts among others. Their time in Eurasia allowed these fighters to adopt 
more radical Islamic beliefs and establish connections with other radicals in Southeast 
Asia and the world, facilitating funding and links between regional extremist groups as 
well as with Al Qaeda. In 1994, Middle Eastern terrorists cooperated with local Southeast 
Asian terrorist organizations to plan and attempt operation Bojinka, which planned the 
simultaneous bombing of several U.S. passenger airplanes over the Pacific. These 
regional associations have allowed the present radical movements across Indonesia, 
Malaysia and the Philippines to cross train, plan and engage in illicit cross border 
activities with assistance from Eurasian terrorist groups.  
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The mujahedeen who returned to Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines from 
Eurasia brought back lethal training, hard-line ideas as well as radical motives, 
establishing radical Islamic schools, transmitting their teachings to new students in 
Southeast Asia. The Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) is a perfect example of this 
phenomenon, founded by Zainon Ismail, a former mujahedeen in the Soviet-Afghan 
conflict.34 Jemmah Islamiyah of Indonesia (founded by Abu Bakar Bashir, and 
Indonesian national of Yemeni heritage) dates to the 1970s with roots in the native 
Indonesian Darul Islam movement, however it gained momentum in the late 1990s at the 
end of the Suharto regime with mujahedeen support. Al Qaeda established its presence in 
Southeast Asia via the ASG, assuring a foothold in the region and expanding its jihadist 
efforts.  
Cooperation among these groups has been seen throughout the three nations as 
they share ideology, training, and assist each other executing operations in the region. On 
February 24, 2005 the Philippine authorities announced the apprehension of four suspects 
involved in the bombings of February 14, 2005 in the Philippines. Among the detained 
were two JI Indonesians, one Malaysian and a Philippine member of the ASG.35  Within 
the Philippines, the insurgent activities taking place in the Sulu archipelago have been 
orchestrated by alliances among the Misuari Breakaway Group (MBG), MILF and the 
ASG, the latter being known for engaging in cross border activities between Borneo and 
the Sulu islands.36  
These groups’ abilities of unrestricted travel throughout the Celebes Sea, adjacent 
waterways and littoral areas allow them to extend their network of terrorist operations to 
the entire region. Evidence of this is the ASG orchestrated kidnappings in Sipidan, 
Malaysia in 2000, and Palawan, Philippines in 2001.37 Additionally, in 2003 a senior JI 
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member known as Zulkifli was captured with other fellow JI members and two Middle 
Eastern operatives as they attempted to enter the Malaysian state of Sabah from the 
nearby Sulu archipelago.38 Previously Zulkifi was the head of the JI in Mindanao and 
was responsible for several orchestrated attacks in this southern island.39  
Training camps have been established in the islands surrounding the Celebes Sea 
as part of the development of more robust and autonomous terrorist organizations. 
Among these are camp Balikpapan in Indonesian Borneo, and camps Vietnam, Palestine 
and Hodeiba in Mindanao.40 These camps host a myriad of training opportunities and 
events for the region’s terrorist groups. In 2002, when the JI experienced a series of 
setbacks due to Indonesian government operatives cracking down on the organization, 
this terrorist group reached to the ASG to coordinate joint training in MILF camps in 
Mindanao.41 In exchange for shelter and training areas, the JI provides the MILF and 
ASG with funding and experts in their camps as well as explosive and other terrorist 
training.42  
In 2000 the government of Malaysia captured several KMM members who 
allegedly trained in MILF camps in Mindanao. While the MILF denies any KMM recruit 
participation in their training areas, the suspects stated they were trained in the Ubaidiah 
and Abu Bakar camps before the latter was captured by the Philippine Army in 1999.43 In 
2003, Taufik Rifki, the JI’s finance and liaison officer was captured by Philippine 
authorities for his involvement in training insurgents at camp Ubaidiah since the late 
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1990s.44 The present dialogue between the government of the Philippines and the MILF 
prevents authorities from classifying this latter organization as a terrorist group, further 
restraining government action against the MILF.45  In 2002 the Malaysian authorities 
captured an Indonesian and one Malaysian terrorist suspect in Sabah, northeastern 
Borneo. These two men, alleged JI members, were accused of providing transportation 
and lodging for recruits on their way to training camps in southern Philippines.46 The 
Darul Islam cell in the Malaysian province of Sabah, provided assistance to Umar Patek 
and Dulmatin, two fugitives involved in the Bali bombings of 2002.  This assistance 
involved transportation across land, maritime boundaries, and weapons smuggling.47 
In Indonesia, the islands of Borneo and Sulawesi host Islamic boarding schools or 
pesantren, which facilitate the JI with a captive audience to proselytize its objectives and 
intents, and provide new recruits.  These students and members travel to the Sulu 
archipelago or Mindanao via Borneo, Sulawesi or the Maluku islands where the JI enjoys 
support from local radical Islamic groups and organizations.48  Not only do these 
territories provide necessary transportation channels for the regions’ terrorist network, the 
current sectarian violence in the Indonesian islands of Sulawesi and the Malukus provide 
the JI with recruits.49  In the southern Philippines, the centuries-long Bangsamoro 
struggle of national liberation against the Christian north and foreign intervention has 
created the perfect atmosphere for the ASG and the MILF to recruit new fighters.50  
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These groups fund part of their operations through criminal activity in the region 
such as kidnappings, piracy and robberies.51  The ASG and JI inherited much of their 
maritime expertise from Al Qaeda’s maritime operations commander, the captured Abdul 
al-Rahim al-Nashiri. This senior member of Al-Qaeda conceived and put into practice the 
idea of employing small boats laden with explosives to inflict damage on U.S. military 
and commercial vessels.52 His ideas and experience proved fatal in the bombing of the 
USS Cole in 2000. As mentioned before, this organization’s kidnapping activities in the 
region have been with the objective to collect ransom money, a major source of funding. 
In 2000, the Libyan president Muammar Khadafi, paid USD 20 million to the ASG in 
return for the release of the Sipadan hostages. This money was then utilized for the 
purchase of more speedboats and weapons, which would be used for further criminal 
activity in the Celebes, Sulu Sea and the adjacent islands.53 This incident was followed 
by the kidnapping of twenty hostages (including 17 Philippine nationals and three 
Americans) from a resort in the island of Palawan in 2001.54 
The rise of Khadaffy Janjalani to the leadership of the ASG after the death of his 
older brother and founder, Abdurajik Janjalani, attempted to bring back the organization 
to its religious purposes and sever ties with criminal activities. However, this continuing 
lucrative business has raised doubts about the ASG’s legitimate Islamic purposes. This 
ransom-seeking terrorist activities prompted experts to believe that pirate activity is 
preferred over the pursue of an Islamic state.55    
C. MARITIME PIRACY 
In 2004, half of the world’s reported cases of maritime piracy took place in 
Southeast Asia, the majority in Indonesian waters, earning this nation’s fame of a pirate 
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haven.56 The Celebes Sea has a long history of maritime piracy which precedes the 
arrival of Islam and Christianity to the region. Piracy was a method for local communities 
to benefit their economies through established markets for pirated goods. It was also a 
means of political gain, attacking neighboring states and weakening their status. This 
practice was a profession which many seafarers adopted.57  
Today’s pirate activity in Southeast Asia, particularly in the Celebes Sea has a 
larger spectrum of effects which go beyond local communities and the region’s nations. 
Victims of piracy are also international shipping companies, large multinational 
corporations, and several nations. Local poor villagers engaged in fishing or small scale 
maritime transportation fall prey to this type of activity as well.58 Local fishermen have 
lost their small boats and engines to pirate attacks, many times these possessions are their 
life savings. These victims are often left abandoned at sea. Without proper action from 
the local governments, many local villagers and fishermen are forced to provide their 
own protection with weapons and hired gunmen to secure their safety.   
In November of 2005, a study by the Merchant International Group predicted that 
Indonesian waters outside of the Malacca Strait would experience over 70 attacks to 
maritime shipping.59 The study placed particular emphasis on the eastern coast of 
Borneo, classifying it as a lawless area where organized crime and local government 
corruption are rampant. The study also mentioned high risk areas such as the Malacca 
Strait, Sulu Archipelago and the Makassar Strait, the latter two being adjacent areas to the 
Celebes Sea. 
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Modern hostage-taking piracy in the Celebes Sea has a history that precedes 
terrorist activities in these waters. Pirates have operated in the area and established 
transnational illicit activities long before modern day terrorist organizations adopted the 
same methods. In 1998, 22 Philippine crew and passengers from the Virgin Pearl were 
taken hostage while transiting the Celebes Sea on its way to the city of Davao in 
Mindanao. The vessel was sunk and the hostages were transported and held in the town 
of Nunukan Timur, Borneo, close to the Malaysian border.60 The captors demanded close 
to USD 1 million from the Philippine government for their release. Today’s piracy affects 
world trade, and has a larger negative impact on those nations with the least resources to 
react to this problem.61 Pirates around the Celebes Sea are not restricted to theft at high 
seas. As mentioned above, kidnappings for ransom has become a lucrative business, 
affecting local tourism industries and international shipping.  
Armed with high technology weapons and systems, short distances between 
objectives and safe havens, these groups can be very effective in the Celebes Sea. Short 
distances allow these groups to travel in small fast boats without refueling, the coastal 
landscape provides ample opportunities for disguise and escape, and the weather in the 
region allows pirates to navigate the seas throughout the year.62 Unlike the Strait of 
Malacca, the Strait of Makassar is not heavily transited for the exception of crucial cargo 
which encounters difficulty through the former strait due to depth limitations.63 The 
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January 2008, the U.S. committed to the installation of critical surveillance equipment in 
the Strait of Makassar to support Indonesia’s efforts to counter maritime terror and 
piracy.64 
The region’s International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center only 
receives reports in English, a language barrier which restrains several vessels from 
reporting attacks or witnessed events.65 From January to March of 2007 most cases of 
piracy in Indonesian waters (3) took place in the Malacca Strait, while only one case was 
reported in the Makassar Strait.66 The above mentioned challenges to piracy reporting in 
the remote and less traveled Celebes Sea may hide a larger amount of unreported 
incidents.  
In 2005, the Philippine Navy clashed with two speedboats allegedly involved in 
the kidnapping of three tugboat crewmembers. The clash resulted in the deaths of two 
gunmen and the escape of the second boat.67 This kidnapping took place in the Malaysian 
province of Sabah, north Borneo. Soon after the clash the speedboat fled in the direction 
of the Sulu Islands, known as the ASG’s area of operations. However, not all vessels that 
fall prey to piracy live to tell. Many pirate attacks result in the killing of the crews, the 
capture of the ship, its reregistration and reflagging, causing the virtual vanishing of the 
vessel.68 As mentioned above, the topography, geography and vegetation of the coasts 
surrounding the Celebes Sea provides the perfect environment for this type of activity.   
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D. ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS 
Christianity arrived to present day Indonesia and the Philippines via the expansion 
of European power into the region. Portuguese missionaries arrived in eastern islands of 
Indonesia in the XVI century while the Spanish arrived in the Philippines commencing 
the colonization and Christianization of the new territories. These historical incursions 
and influences around the Celebes Sea resulted in today’s regional domestic conflicts in 
Muslim Mindanao, the Maluku archipelago, Sulawesi and Borneo.   
1. Indonesia 
Iberian colonizers had little tolerance for those of the same faith that occupied 
their homeland for centuries, which led them to forcefully convert the newly found 
Islamic pagans. As a response, these communities united under their common Islamic 
faith and motivated other persecuted groups to convert to Islam. The Portuguese 
influence in the Indonesian archipelago was successful in establishing colonies and 
creating Christian populations in the eastern islands, particularly in Timor, the Maluku 
Islands and north Sulawesi.  
This Dutch and Portuguese push into the central potions of the islands triggered 
the accelerated spread of Islam throughout the inland populations. Dutch forces arrived in 
the western Indonesian islands but were not characterized for having a strong 
proselytizing agenda as their Iberian counterparts.69 However, Dutch rule replaced the 
existing structures, imposing a European style of rule, fueling the initiation and local 
support of Islamic based anti-colonial resistance. Jihadist movements emerged in areas 
such as Aceh, where the native population violently opposed Dutch rule and influence, 
resulting in brutal colonial repression.  
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In Central Sulawesi, the historical religious division between a Christian north 
and a Muslim south sustains a state of conflict in this Indonesian island. Traditionally the 
religious communities in this island lived together in peace. An outbreak of violence in 
the late 1990s drove the city of Poso into turmoil between armed religious factions. This 
may have been the result of a similar conflict in the Maluku archipelago or the outcome 
of the Muslim migrations from the rest of Indonesia into Sulawesi which reduced the 
proportions of the Christian population.70 Violence between both factions is very 
common and often spills onto non warring parties.  
In 2006, the bodies of three beheaded Christian girls were found in the Central 
Sulawesi village of Gebong Rejo.71 These victims were killed as Ramadan trophies by 
Muslim radicals of the island’s warring faction, directed by an Indonesian named 
Hasanuddin with connections to the MILF. In October of the same year a group of 
Christians were arrested for killing two Muslim men in retribution for the killing of 
Catholic militants.72 Even though this tit-for-tat lethal violence takes place, government 
officials refuse to admit the religious motives behind the attacks, for fear of further 
spread of violence on the island. Government official, Minister Jusuf Kalla accused the JI 
of involvement in the attacks to three Christian villages in October of 2003.73 Growing 
evidence of training camps in Sulawesi which emerged after the arrival of fleeing JI 
operatives from Java, solidify the belief that organized terrorism is fueling the present 
religious conflict. 
Similar transmigration programs took place in the Maluku archipelago, increasing 
the Muslim population of the islands and reducing the traditional Christian majority. 
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Following the exit of Suharto from power, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, and the 
anti Christian violence in Jakarta (1998) which left six Christian Ambonese dead, 
widespread violence erupted in the island of Ambon and quickly spread into the 
surrounding Malukan islands.74 Ongoing violence has forced the government in Jakarta 
to deploy military and police forces to the region. In May 2004 the Brimob paramilitary 
unit was deployed to Ambon to support security and sweep operations.75 This unrest also 
resulted in the increasing support for the independence of the Malukus, promoting the 
creation of the South Maluku Republic (RMS). In the summer of 2007, the appearance of 
separatist flags caused widespread protests throughout Indonesia against the government 
for its lack of action against pro independence groups.76  
Borneo’s native population is mainly composed of Dayaks and ethnic Malays. 
Since the independence of Indonesia, strict Muslim Madurese arrived on the island as 
part of the government sponsored migrations. The Madurese customs, religions (most 
Dayaks are Christians) and their increasing numbers have created friction with the 
traditional communities.77 This friction erupted in violence at the hands of the Dayaks 
and Malays, resulting in killings and cannibalism of Madurese victims. Sights of limbs 
and decapitated bodies were common after Dayak warriors attacked Madurese villages, in 
one instance over 500 were killed in the village of Sinkawang. By 1999 over 10,000 
Madurese had been displaced by the violence: however the Indonesian military was able 




                                                 
74 “Ethno-Religious Conflict in Maluku,” Okusi, http://www.okusi.net/garydean/works/maluku.html 
(accessed March 28, 2008). 
75 “More paramilitaries sent to troubled Ambon, toll rises to 38,” Indahnesia, 
http://news.indahnesia.com/item/200405021/more_paramilitaries_sent_to_troubled_ambon,_toll_rises_to_
38.php (accessed March 26, 2008). 
76 “Jakarta Urges Calm as More RMS Flags Found in Ambon,” ASAP, http://www.asia-pacific-
action.org/news/jp_jakartaurgescalmasmorerms_030707.htm (accessed April 3, 2008). 
77 “Ethnic Groups Involved in the Borneo Conflict,” Fox News, March 7, 2001. 
78 Richard Lloyd Parry, “Carnage and Cannibalism in Borneo as Ethnic Conflict Rages,” The 
Independent, March 24, 1999. 
  27
violence between the Dayaks and Madurese resulted in thousands of immigrants leaving 
Borneo, the government deployed troops and police to the island with strict orders to 
shoot any aggressors.79  
2. Philippines 
The Spaniards conquered The Philippines, converting the northern island of 
Luzon and the Vizayan archipelago while Mindanao remained Muslim. As mentioned 
above, the southern Muslim population was able to maintain a certain degree of 
autonomy as the Spanish invaders were not able to completely control the southern 
islands. This was the case until Don José Oyanguren’s expedition which began the 
Christianization of the Philippine Muslim territories after 1848. Under American rule, the 
U.S. engaged in southern counterinsurgency operations aimed at subordinating the 
islands to Manila, however, the U.S. did not employ Christianity as a tactic. Philippine 
President Ramon Magsaysay successfully encouraged the migration of northern Christian 
Filipinos to the southern islands, causing the rapid spread of the faith and the present 
Christian majority in Mindanao80. 
This historical Philippine division between a Christian majority population 
controlling the central government and an impoverished and disadvantaged Mindanao 
and Sulu archipelago made this religious conflict a regional reality. The Bangasamoro 
movement became a historical struggle against invading non-Muslims such as the 
Spanish, American, Japanese and Christian Filipinos since the arrival of the first 
Europeans in the XVI century until present day.  
The policies of promoted migrations of Christian northerners to the southern 
islands not only made the Muslims a minority within their own lands, but also reduced 
them to the present provinces of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). 
Over 90% of the population on the island of Mindanao was Muslim at the beginning of 
the XX century, almost 100 years later they comprise less than 20% of the inhabitants. 
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Initial separatist movements such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) were 
able to engage in successful diplomatic dialogue with the government of the Philippines, 
achieving their goal for more regional autonomy. This secular movement gave way to 
two radical Islamic groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Misuari 
Breakaway Group (MBG), the latter was founded in Cairo, Egypt.81 
E. TRINATIONAL SECURITY ATTEMPTS 
Terrorism as a global threat did not become a priority for these nations until 2001 
for Malaysia and the Philippines and in 2002 for Indonesia. Until these years, terrorist 
and criminal groups were a domestic problem which these nations addressed unilaterally, 
resisting foreign intervention. One exception to foreign interference is the current peace 
talks between the Philippine government and the MILF which have been hosted by 
Malaysia.82 This diplomatic process and its associated cease-fire have resulted in a severe 
decrease on violent exchanges between both parties and the reduction of training and 
shelter provided to other terrorist organizations such as the ASG and JI.83 
It is important to clarify that these transnational terrorist groups did not become a 
significant threat to any of these nations until the end of the 1990s when former Eurasian 
conflict mujahedeen fighters returned to their homelands after democratization. Once 
these radical recruiters and clerics were immersed in madrassas and other social circles, 
the tumultuous events of the late 1990s offered them with the perfect opportunity to 
catalyze their objectives while the government focused on larger economic, political and 
security issues.  
The limited unilateral efforts to counter these groups and the favorable 
environments these have enjoyed in the remote regions of these three nations allowed 
them to flourish and engage in cross border activities, worsening these nations’ security 
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situation. The democratization of these three nations in the 1990s and the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997 made Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines vulnerable to internal strife 
and the rise of radical groups within their borders. The combination of democratic 
transition and economic decline gave these radical movements the fertile soil needed to 
re-energize their cause. The simultaneous emergence of secessionist movements in Timor 
and the Malukus (1999-2001) helped convince groups that Christians and other different 
ethnic groups were behind the financial, social and political problems these nations faced. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The presence of illicit foreign and domestic elements flourishing in the Celebes 
Sea, where triborder security is limited, complicates the threat in the region, requiring 
decisive and effective cooperation to control the sea and littoral areas. Unilateral action 
by one of the nations will not be effective as these groups have the ability to move across 
borders, adapt to new lands and continue operations. As mentioned before, the geography 
and topography of the region provide ample concealment for these activities. This is an 
advantage which poses a considerable challenge for governments with limited resources 
to combat the region’s crime and terror.  
The presence of ethnic and religious conflicts on the islands bordering the Celebes 
Sea provide fertile ground for the propagation of radical Islamic rhetoric and the chaos 
needed to conduct piracy operations without detection. Growing resentment against 
Christian and animist populations in the Celebes Sea has produced a captive audience for 
radical Islamic clerics. The targeted individuals are easily convinced that their situation is 
mainly due to the negligent attitude of their government to the Muslim population due to 
“anti-Islamic principles” such as democracy and secularism. These ideals are based on 
the principles that Islam is being subdued by a Judeo-Christian conspiracy via economic 
and political means, and current Islamic leaders have been polluted by non Islamic ideals 
distancing them from the pillars of the faith. Some of these Islamic radical groups desire 
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to bring back their nations to the “right path of Islam,” establishing Shari’a Law and 
recovering the true essence of Islam also known as salafism.84 
Part of the funding for these organizations originates from piracy, a historical 
lifestyle and means to obtain power in the Celebes Sea. However, present pirate activates 
have larger repercussions than during the colonial years. This increasing threat can lead 
to an increase in militias in the absence of government protection, further delegitimizing 
the respective governments’ rule within their borders.  The power vacuum left in the 
peripheries of these nations provides the needed support for terrorist and separatist 
organizations to sustain agendas and operations.  
In order to counteract this complex and self supporting threat the governments in 
the region must act multilaterally and synergically. These three nations must have a 
common understanding of the threat’s gravity and a high priority to combat it. Unilateral 
or haphazard efforts will only dissipate the threat to other islands, as these groups have 
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III. REASONS FOR LIMITED TRINATIONAL SECURITY 
COOPERATION IN THE CELEBES SEA 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the chapter is to explain the underlying reasons why the 
governments of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines do not engage in more 
comprehensive security cooperation in the Celebes Sea region. The three reasons I 
discuss in this chapter are historical mistrust, domestic political concerns and limited 
force projection capabilities. Historical events among these nations have caused deeply 
rooted mistrust which affects their extent of cooperation in securing the Celebes Sea. 
These nations’ willingness to cooperate with each other ends when territorial sovereignty 
is in question, particularly when a neighboring country’s forces are operationally present 
within a neighbor’s borders. These historical events are worsened by recurring territorial 
disputes. 
Domestic political concerns also shape these governments’ responses to 
neighboring states. The military forces of these nations are also ill-equipped to effectively 
counteract the transnational criminal and terrorist threat present in this sea. The tri-border 
region’s distance from the nations’ capital obliges the governments to stage semi-
permanent forces in forward areas and establish constant vigilance in the Celebes Sea. In 
this chapter I examine the above mentioned challenges which affect Indonesia, Malaysia 
and the Philippines and why these have caused the governments to resist establishing 
trilateral security cooperation in the Celebes Sea.  
B. HISTORICAL MISTRUST 
Several historical events among these three nations sustain a level of mistrust 
which restrains these governments from establishing closer ties. Some of these events 
have reoccurring patterns which worsen their mutual relationships. In this segment I will 
discuss three trinational friction points. 
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1. Indonesia’s Konfrontasi Policy and Foreign Interventions 
In 1963, the government of Indonesia assumed the “Konfrontasi” hostile policy 
against Malaysia, which stemmed from Jakarta’s strong opposition to the creation of the 
Malaysian state due to its colonial nature and the former involvement of the British 
colony on Indonesian affairs. During the 1950s, the Malaysian, Singaporean and U.S. 
governments supported rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi while Indonesia attempted to 
unify the country.85 From 1958 to 1959, the Malaysian government offered asylum to the 
fleeing leadership of the Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic, 
providing refuge to an enemy of Sukarno’s regime. This was aired by opposition groups 
in Malaysia who exploited this opportunity to accuse the government of supporting 
insurgency groups in Indonesia.86  
The Eisenhower administration’s suspicious approach to the Sukarno regime led 
the U.S. to support rebel movements in the Indonesian archipelago, launching support 
missions from neighboring states like the Philippines.87 During this American endeavor, 
former U.S. Air Force pilot First Lieutenant Allen Pope was shot down in Indonesian 
airspace while providing support to the rebel forces. When captured, authorities 
discovered he was a military member under a CIA contract with a mission originating 
from Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines to attack an Indonesian vessel convoy 
headed to quell down the rebellion in Morotai.88  
Prior to Sukarno’s Konfrontasi declaration, the Indonesian government supported 
and aided insurgency efforts in the Sultanate of Brunei and other opposition movements 
within Malaysian territory.89 The domestic opposition to the creation of the Malaysian 
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state was led by Inche A. M. Azahari, a local politician who had close ties with the 
Indonesian and Philippine governments. In late 1962, Azahari and his followers initiated 
a revolt in Brunei where he declared himself premier of the independent state, which 
became a short lived attempt due to the effectiveness of British troops, crushing the 
rebellion.90   
Just as the U.S. used the Philippines as a platform to violate Indonesian 
sovereignty, the British did the same through from Malaysian territory. The previously 
mentioned increase of British troops in the region used Malaysia as an operating base to 
attack Indonesian targets within Indonesian territory.91 These missions were designed to 
maintain the newly arrived Indonesian forces from exerting control over the Kalimantan 
provinces while keeping them at a distance from the border.  
2. The Malaysian and Philippine Dispute over Sabah 
In 1962 the Government of the Philippines claimed the Malaysian province of 
Sabah as part of the Republic of the Philippines due to former ownership under the 
southern Sultanate of Sulu. The dispute arose from the terms in which the province 
changed possession from the Sultanate to Baron de Overbeck in 1878. According to the 
Malaysian translation of the document, the province was ceded to the Baron, while the 
Philippines interpret the transaction as a temporary lease between both parties.92 This is 
further complicated by the Baron’s representation of a private firm, not the sovereign 
government of the United Kingdom. This Malaysian province later became part of the 
British Protectorate of North Borneo, which then became part of the Malaysian 
Federation.  
During this period Malaysia found itself surrounded by hostile neighbors which 
doubted the legitimate reason for its national existence. This confrontation of Indonesia 
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and the Philippines towards a same rival brought both nations together, exerting pressure 
on the British colonial power and what seemed to be the remnants of its empire in the 
region. The Philippine claim on the Borneo province eventually quieted down until press 
reports revealed that a secret force had been trained on the island of Corregidor. This 
revelation appeared in the Manila press in 1968 and was quickly labeled as the 
“Corregidor Affair,” airing renewed Philippine efforts to claim the territory, this time 
through violent means.93  
This plot involved the training of over 200 southern Filipinos of Tausug and Sama 
origin with the purpose of infiltrating Sabah and commencing a revolution. The group 
became mutinous when the trainees discovered the nature of their mission, which would 
have involved acts of violence against their ethnic and religious brothers in the Malaysian 
province. The government reacted by killing them in Corregidor Island where they were 
undergoing training, one survivor, Jibin Arula, escaped to reveal the story to the Manila 
press.94  
The Philippine government has not retracted its claim to the northern Borneo 
territory of Sabah. In fact, Manila revived its claim in 2002 as a result of Malaysian 
government deportation of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW).95 Close to 300,000 
Philippine citizens reside legally or illegally in Sabah, most of them working under the 
OFW program under expired visas. The Malaysian government began a crackdown on 
the large numbers of illegal workers, resulting in arrests and deportation as well as 
alleged violence and rape of the Filipino deportees.96 Similar procedures are being taken 
against illegal Indonesians in Sabah, resulting in simultaneous Indonesian and Philippine 
government protests against the Malaysian government.  
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3. Border Sensitivities and Other Issues 
ASEAN’s principle of non interference among its members may play a major role 
in limiting these nations’ interference on the pursuit of respective domestic terrorist and 
criminal groups.97 This hinders the ability for these nations to successfully monitor, 
pursue and prosecute these transnational groups as they quickly cross borders undetected  
while fleeing any one nation’s government forces. Current border disputes among 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines may also contribute to the resistance of these 
nations to allow rights of hot pursuit within each other’s territorial waters.  
In 2004, the Malaysian government refused to conduct maritime joint patrols with 
Indonesia, Singapore and the U.S. in the Malacca Strait. The Malaysian foreign minister 
insisted that the presence of foreign troops within national waters presented an 
infringement of national sovereignty.98 As a result, Malaysia agreed to limit the 
cooperation to bilateral exercises and coordinated patrols along the maritime border. This 
nation further emphasized its desire to engage in an operational hand over of 
responsibility when hot pursuits reach Malaysian waters, a decision which affects anti-
piracy efforts in the Celebes Sea.99  
Indonesia and Malaysia have a history of restricting foreign maritime passage 
close to critical borders with domestic turmoil. Indonesia forbade the maritime traffic in 
Acehnese waters in support of counterinsurgency operations while Malaysia took similar 
measure off the coast of Sabah to protect critical off shore islands.100 During peacetime, 
vessels of high importance are escorted by Malaysian Navy vessels, ensuring the security 
of passage while maintaining foreign armed forces from incurring within national 
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maritime borders.101 In 2003, the Philippine President stated that the AFP is not impeded 
by borders when pursuing border crossing Muslim guerillas in the southern part of the 
nation, causing immediate Malaysian government backlash through the exportation of 
OFW and heightened security measures.102  
The north Borneo coasts along the Indonesian and Malaysian borders are rich in 
important mineral deposits. In 2002, the International Court of Justice ruled that the 
islands of Ligitan and Sipidan belong to Malaysia, however both these nations’ maritime 
claims in these coastal areas show sustained friction.103 This enduring dispute escalated 
to a mutual deployment of forces in 2005 as a result of both nations awarding oil 
exploration contracts in the same territory to two different petroleum companies.104 This 
situation was solved through bilateral diplomatic efforts, however during the heightened 
dispute, Malaysia accused Indonesia of trespassing into its national waters, further 
enhancing the Malaysian aversion towards Indonesian armed forces within its borders.   
C. INDONESIA’S DOMESTIC CONCERNS AND ACTIONS TOWARDS 
TERRORISM 
After September 11, 2001, the Philippines and Malaysia offered immediate 
support to the United States in its endeavors to hunt down the Islamic radicals. Malaysia 
immediately denounced Al Qaeda as an extremist Muslim organization not representing 
the real ideology of the religion. The Philippines immediately offered the U.S. the use of 
its former bases of Clark and Subic Bay for military response to the attack. In response, 
the American administration offered assistance to the government of the Philippines in its 
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efforts to defeat the Muslim insurrection in the southern Philippines.105 Meanwhile, 
Indonesia did not show the same commitment to the American led cause until the Bali 
bombings of 2002.  
At the wake of the attack on the Balinese tourist nightclub, the Indonesian 
government began deliberations to emplace tougher anti terrorism laws, elevating the 
national priority with regards to this threat.106 However, the Indonesian government has 
been careful not to ally or align itself too closely with the U.S. for fears of upsetting 
voters. This nation’s Muslim majority and the leadership of moderate Muslim 
organizations expressed disapproval to U.S.’ policy in Afghanistan and the Middle East, 
accusing the U.S. of destroying sovereign nations.107      
The government of President Megawati did not address the problem caused by 
radical Islamic schools and organizations which supported JI, allowing these terrorist 
groups to recruit and train in Java with limited government counteraction. This was 
worsened by both Megawati and the present Yudhoyono’s administrations resistance to 
declare JI as a terrorist organization until 2008.108 Prior to this decision, the JI was able 
to maintain uninterrupted financial support through real estate holdings, charity 
donations, and other non fluid assets.109 The recent decision by the Indonesian courts 
would now allow fluidity in the law enforcement system to prosecute the JI and other 
terrorist organizations more effectively.110  
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D. LIMITED FORCE CAPABILITIES 
Another challenge Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines face is the status of 
their law enforcement and military forces in regards to infrastructure and capabilities. 
While this is not a deeply entrenched historical obstacle, the current reality of these 
nation’s force capabilities limits their potential to unilaterally pursue security in the 
triborder area, making trilateral cooperation a more difficult objective.  
The Indonesian military (TNI) is currently underfunded by the central 
administration in Jakarta. The Indonesian national budget does not completely cover the 
needs of the Indonesian military, causing the armed forces to seek additional sources of 
funding which cannot be quantified.111 This directly impacts the ability of the 
government to successfully control the military and its operations throughout the 
archipelago. In instances, the TNI has been accused of supporting terrorist organizations 
such as Laksar Jihad and militias which were responsible for the 1999 unlawful killings 
in East Timor.112 
As a result of these human rights violations, the congressionally approved Leahy 
Law forbids American support of the Indonesian military, which includes funding and 
training. Consequently, the equipment of the TNI has been deteriorating and has not been 
successfully replaced by similar higher technology equivalents.113 President 
Yudhoyono’s administration was successful in increasing the portion of the national 
budget dedicated to the military, however the amount approved was short of what the 
defense ministry identified as critical.114  
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In Malaysia, the government approved necessary funding for essential equipment 
needed in Sabah to deter the incursions of Philippine insurgents in the Malay province.115 
This government’s decision came as a response to the Sipadan and Pandanan islands 
kidnappings in 2000. However, the increase in military expenditure is not enough to 
counteract the large coastal area surrounding Sabah, composed mainly of small islands, 
close to international borders through which other nations’ forces may not cross. Further 
challenges to the Malaysian armed forces are due to its traditional focus on 
counterinsurgency and less emphasis on border control, causing the disproportionate 
underdevelopment of the nation’s coastal defenses.116  
Furthermore, this government’s custom of purchasing military hardware from 
multiple suppliers may prove economically feasible and efficient in the beginning.117 
However, the logistical requirement to support and sustain multiple variations and types 
of machinery may force the increase and diversification of maintenance expertise which 
could increase the overall cost of maintenance.  
The Philippine’s lack of national police compared to the larger size of the army 
impedes this nation to properly prosecute terrorism suspects throughout its extensive 
archipelago. Even though Indonesia did not declare JI as a terrorist organization until 
2008, this nation has been able to make more arrests of terrorism suspects that the 
Philippines.118  
The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report of 2006 mentions the lack of 
cooperation and inefficiencies between the Philippine law enforcement and criminal 
justice systems as significant hurdles to the effective prosecution of criminals and 
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terrorists.119 Other obstacles are due to the severe lack of maritime police and coastal 
security force which allow terrorism and piracy to freely operate along the extensive 
archipelago. This report mentions current backlog problems in the judicial branch causing 
the delay of case procedures and lengthening judicial processes.   
Equipment issues are a key obstacle in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Since 
the U.S. handed over Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base, the AFP’s opportunity to 
obtain equipment and repair parts for their U.S.-made military equipment was reduced to 
Foreign Military Sales channels. The inability of the military to repair equipment close to 
front lines forces the leadership to rely on a central Manila maintenance facility to repair 
all equipment. It is also very common for the AFP’s weapons and ammunition to fall in 
the hands of the insurgency. U.S. journalist Eliza Griswold was shown U.S. made rifles 
equipped with night vision devices during a visit to an MILF camp in Mindanao.120 Some 
of this equipment fell in the hands of the insurgency, however this was not as a result of 
battlefield spoils. According to the interviewed MILF commander, AFP members sell 
weapons and ammunition to the insurgency.  
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines do not have enough military, police and 
other civilian law enforcement forces to deploy and sustain in remote regions of their 
nations such as the triborder area. Even if these governments were to authorize border 
incursions and hot pursuit, these nations would not have the force projection capabilities 
or necessary domestic interagency frameworks to ensure security cooperation. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The combination of deep-rooted rivalries and among Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines, worsened by recurring events when former claims are raised, maintain an 
environment of mistrust among these nations. Other more recent actions by these 
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governments perpetuate the region’s friction such as the OFW deportations from and the 
deployment of military forces in support of territorial disputes between Indonesia and 
Malaysia. Mistrust among Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines restrains the depth of 
security cooperation, particularly in the effectiveness of cross border criminal and 
terrorist pursuit. The inability of these nations’ forces to cross into their neighbor’s waters 
while on an official capacity to pursue these groups allows the fugitives to exploit seams, 
which are protected in the name of territorial sovereignty. Malaysia’s proposal to exercise 
on the border operational transfers of responsibility is significantly affected by the 
readiness, training and ability of the region’s forces to rapidly deploy and share 
continuous information under time constraints. 
This is further complicated by Indonesia’s domestic politics which maintain 
Jakarta from taking a harsh stance against JI, which was not declared as a terrorist 
organization until April 2008 due to fears of alienating the population. This Indonesian 
government response towards domestic terrorism showed the world its resistance to 
openly commit against the regions’ anti terrorist efforts. Jakarta’s delay to even consider 
terrorism as a major threat in Southeast Asia was more evidently proven after its 
resistance to joins its neighbors in officially condemning radical Islamic groups. This 
government’s decision further impaired regional security efforts, particularly in the 
ungoverned Celebes Sea.  
The immediate hindrance to the security of the Celebes Sea is the present status of 
these nation’s military forces and law enforcement agencies, which would find it difficult 
to conduct limited unilateral actions. The domestic cooperation between law enforcement 
and the judicial branch of the governments appears flawed, posing obstacles to the 
effective prosecution of criminals and terrorists operating in the region. While all three 
governments attempt to increase their patrols and presence in the Celebes Sea region, 
other priorities such as domestic conflicts and turmoil in Indonesian and Philippine 
territories compete for scarce security national resources.  These nations do not have the 
manpower, equipment and means of sustainment to maintain an efficient permanent force 
in the triborder region. 
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IV. NEW SURGE OF TRINATIONAL SECURITY 
COOPERATION IN THE CELEBES SEA 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
International pressure, domestic desire and regional efforts have slowly pushed 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines to further increase security cooperation in the 
Celebes Sea. While in the past, most of these governments opted to unilaterally deal with 
internal insurgencies, criminal and terrorist groups, new bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation has promoted closer neighborly ties. Some initial attempts included the 
interaction of military forces as well as intelligence and law enforcement agencies, 
adding depth to the security agreements among these nations.  
While Malaysia maintained a solid position prohibiting the presence of 
Indonesian or Philippine forces within its waters under official capacity, new trination 
agreements have paved the way to joint operations among Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines. However, some of this new motivation may be a result of these nations’ 
increasing maritime security agreements with increased willingness of external powers. 
This has not only motivated bilateral and trilateral agreements, regional defense dialogue 
has also resulted from ASEAN’s decision to host meetings among the member nations’ 
defense ministers, adding another aspect of ASEAN cooperation. In this chapter I outline 
the results of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines’ changing attitudes towards 
security cooperation in the Celebes Sea.  
B. TRINATION EFFORTS 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have been successful in engaging in 
trilateral dialogue with the purpose of establishing more concrete security cooperation 
efforts. Some of these initiatives ranged from establishing links between military and 
security agencies to engaging in tactical level joint missions to secure the common 
porous maritime border of the Celebes Sea.   
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In 2001, Philippine President Gloria Arroyo and Indonesia’s President Megawati 
Sukarnoputri discussed plans for greater bilateral security agreements while establishing 
necessary trade agreements. The discussions included the establishment of an aggressive 
combined response to maritime piracy and increased cooperation between the nations’ 
intelligence and security services.121 Later in December of the same year, officials from 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines approved a treaty to fight transnational terrorism 
and crime among the three nations.  
This was finalized at a conference in Manila where other regional nations like 
Singapore and Thailand attended to observe the event.122 This treaty committed the 
signatory nations’ intelligence agencies to practice collective efforts and military forces 
to engage in rapid combined deployments against regional threats. This was followed by 
the signature of a trade and security bilateral agreement between Indonesia and the 
Philippines in 2002, cementing deals to share intelligence which would lead to a 
reduction in cross border trafficking and piracy.123  
Indonesia and Malaysia attempted to host a multilateral anti sea mine exercise 
with Asia-Pacific nations in 2003, however the scare of Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) postponed the initiative.124 This was part of the region’s effort to 
counter possible terrorist threats on international commerce based on evidence that these 
organizations would engage economic targets. Other non-security efforts have indirectly 
increased the security of the triborder region. In 2004, the three nations’ governments 
declared plans to establish a Sulu-Sulawesi Marine Eco-region with the purpose of saving 
the sea’s underwater flora and fauna.125 This would increase the monitoring of 
environmental friendly fishing practices and the piracy threats in the region which have 
affected the livelihood of local fishermen and merchants. 
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In 2005, the governments of Indonesia and the Philippines reached a four-point 
agreement, which included bilateral decisions on security. Indonesian President 
Yudhoyono explicitly addressed the necessity to safeguard the areas of North Sulawesi, 
Borneo, southern Mindanao and northern Maluku, which surround the Celebes Sea.126 
The president also stated that both nations and other regional partners would meet in the 
future to increase cooperation among their respective intelligence, security and justice 
agencies.   
In this same year the Malaysian and Philippine governments agreed on increasing 
the frequency of maritime patrols between the state of Sabah and the Sulu archipelago. 
These patrols involved bilateral naval force interactions as well as law enforcement 
agencies, increasing the scope and the involvement of these nations’ governments. This 
bilateral decision and commitment was a response to the ongoing piracy activity in the 
area where gunmen kidnapped the crew of a Malaysian tugboat and fled to the Sulu 
islands in early 2005.127  
At the end of 2005, the President of the Philippines proposed the respective heads 
of state from Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia to establish joint patrols from the Celebes 
Sea to Irian Jaya, including the Malukus.128 This proposal was welcomed by the 
government representatives of Indonesia and Malaysia, marking a significant change of 
attitude and previous resistance to joint patrols and foreign presence within national 
waters. These measures extended the patrolled area beyond what was agreed during 
regular exercises, implementing a permanent joint measure along the common coastal 
areas of these nations. This proposal emerged as a necessity to stabilize and govern the 
region to attract investors and business.  
In April 2005, the Manila government stated its interest to host joint exercises in 
Mindanao and Sulu islands, and extend the joint patrols to Australia and the ASEAN 
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nations.129 These arrangements would facilitate any partner nation to participate in joint 
operations and exercises in the Philippines. In November of the same year Indonesia, 
Malaysia and the Philippines reached an agreement to enhance trilateral security 
cooperation along their borders and common maritime regions during the ASEAN Chiefs 
of Defense Forces Informal Meeting held in Manila. These nations’ defense ministers 
developed a program named “Coastal Watch South” in which the nations will adopt 
current Philippine coastal measures and extend them to north Sulawesi and Sabah.130  
This measure determines clear and mandated maritime lanes of travel, any course 
alteration in the Celebes Sea would lead to the interception of the vessel by the respective 
nations’ authorities.  
In 2006, the Indonesian and Philippine police joined forces to draft security 
agreements to counter illegal trafficking, border crossing and terrorist threats between 
both nations.131 Increased intelligence cooperation was seen in 2006 during similar 
arrangements, the Malaysian government granted Philippine authorities access to an ASG 
member captured on the coast of Sabah. During the same timeframe, the Philippine 
authorities handed Dulmatin’s wife (a wanted terror suspect accused of taking part of the 
2002 Bali bombings) and other terrorists over to authorities in Indonesia where they had 
outstanding warrants.132  
In 2006, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and other partners (to include the 
U.S.), held Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT), a maritime 
security exercise off the coast of Phuket, Thailand. This multilateral effort involved these 
nations’ naval forces responding to simulated piracy attacks on commercial configured 
vessels, presenting a realistic scenario for future operations.133 This training event 
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emphasized the need for multinational force coordination and intelligence sharing to 
effectively respond to common threats in the region. 
In the summer of 2007 the Indonesian and the Philippine Navy increased naval 
presence and activity in their common archipelagic borders to secure economic relations 
established between southern Philippine and northern Indonesian communities.134 This 
naval interaction was facilitated by the Bilateral Naval Exercise Coordinated Patrol 
between both nations which took place on July 13-23 of the same year, further enhancing 
Coastal Watch South’s goals of maritime commerce security among the neighboring 
islands. During this exercise the Indonesian Navy apprehended two Philippine fishermen 
who entered Indonesian waters illegally and were returned to Philippine authorities 
accordingly.  
In March 2007 the Malaysian government expressed its willingness to work with 
foreign governments and their militaries to defend its coastal waters against terrorist 
threats.135 Particular emphasis was placed on the maritime region surrounding the Borneo 
provinces of Sarawak and Sabah.  In November of 2007, the Malaysian and Indonesian 
authorities attended the High Level and General Border Committees held in Surabaya 
where they discussed the idea of establishing a permanent joint patrol along the common 
Sabah and East Kalimantan border, to include land and maritime frontiers.136  
This talk was held between the nations’ chiefs of defense while discussing other 
common maritime border threats along the Strait of Malacca. This discussion was 
followed by the Malaysian decision to station national police forces in remote islands 
near Sabah.137 This move came as a result of the International Court of Justice decision 
to award sovereignty of Ligitan and Sipidan to Malaysia as mentioned in previous 
chapters. This proposal would commit the members of these forces to train in criminal 
investigation to accelerate the law enforcement process in the far region. In the past, 
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those captured by the police where handed over to the national criminal investigative 
services, lengthening the process due to bureaucracy and distance from these services.  
C. EFFORTS WITH POWERS OUTSIDE THE REGION 
International interest and involvement in the region’s maritime security has 
increased and has seen the growing presence of other powers. Australia and New 
Zealand’s economic ties with China and other northeast Asian nations, and their 
increasing demand for energy have prompted them to establish ties with Indonesia and 
the Philippines to secure necessary maritime passages.138 Due to the former nations’ 
geographical location, their maritime commerce transits the Celebes Sea and its critical 
straits. This approach led Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines to engage 
their respective law enforcement agencies to exchange expertise and gain experience 
working together. This effort gradually led to the interaction of their military institutions 
and forces. Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have shown interest and willingness 
to work with other nations and powers outside of the region with relation to security 
issues in their border areas, to include the Celebes Sea. Australia and the U.S. are two 
nations which have been involved in bilateral cooperation in the triborder region. 
In 2000, Philippine Secretary Orlando Mercado stated his confidence on the 
movement towards establishing multilateral security cooperation to deal with local and 
common threats in the region.139 This came as a result of the 2000 U.S. Pacific 
Command’s initiative to hold a multinational planning conference with the intention of 
establishing common norms and processes for nations in the Pacific region to operate in 
support of a combined contingency. This would mark a further step from the common 
bilateral exercises held with regional partners and foreign powers. In support of this effort  
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the U.S. Pacific Command directed U.S. Forces to engage with the AFP in bilateral field 
and staff training exercises such as Balikatan and Philippine Subject Matter Expertise 
Exchange.  
During Balikatan and other annual U.S.-Philippine bilateral exercises, several 
Civil Action Projects with medical, dental, veterinary and engineering foci take place to 
improve the lives of remote communities in the Philippine Republic.140 The Philippine 
government and U.S. Pacific Command envision broadening this exercise to include 
other nations in the area participating under a simulated scenario driven by a common 
threat to the region. The U.S. also approached Malaysia with similar purposes. In 2002 
Malaysia and the U.S. held talks on the idea to establish a counterterrorism training 
center in Malaysia with the objective to provide necessary training to the regional forces 
to counter this threat.141 This resulted in the establishment o the Southeast Asia Regional 
Center for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT) in 2003.142 The first participants included 
representatives from the ten ASEAN members attending law enforcement and military 
training.  
In 2002, the governments of Australia and Malaysia agreed on bilateral efforts to 
combat terrorism in the region. This would allow law enforcement agencies from both 
nations to cooperate in the prosecution of terrorist groups through the sharing of 
intelligence, training and other education. This agreement is a significant step for 
Malaysia, a nation which has traditionally resisted Australia’s intentions in the region, 
being the only nation in the triborder area not to sign a defense cooperation treaty with 
Australia.143 However, in late 2004 the government of Malaysia rejected the Australian 
counterterrorism plan of basing troops in Southeast Asia, further stating that Malaysia 
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can deal with terrorism in a unilateral fashion.144  On April of 2008, Datuk Salim, 
Malaysia’s high Commissioner to Australia mentioned that Kuala Lumpur should seize 
the vast mutual cooperation opportunities Australia offers, to include defense 
agreements.145    
The Philippines has also established defense cooperation agreements with 
Australia, to include the Philippine-Australia Defense Cooperation Group established in 
2004. The agreement was established by both nations with the purpose of cementing a 
bilateral defense treaty encompassing mutual interests, including maritime security.146 In 
2006, both nations’ government officials agreed on the JI being the largest threat in 
Southeast Asia. Both nations also agreed JI had the capacity to attack any nation in the 
region.147 Finally in 2007 both nations signed a defense cooperation treaty which would 
allow the AFP to receive training and key equipment from the Australian government to 
include fast patrol boats and maritime surveillance systems for installation in the 
republic’s southern coasts.148 The Australian actions are not meant to compete with the 
support and cooperation the U.S. seeks with the Philippines, but meant to compliment the 
security of the Philippines, not replace the U.S. as the primary defense partner. 
In 2006, the Indonesian government approached the Australian government to 
establish more extensive bilateral maritime security cooperation.149 Some of the items 
discussed involved laying beacon devices in the water to facilitate the monitoring of 
maritime traffic between both nations. Further talks in Lombok led both defense 
ministers to agree on their nations not to foment and support separatist movements 
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violating their respective nations’ sovereignty.150 The following year both Indonesian and 
Australian governments agreed to enhance bilateral military cooperation, including joint 
efforts in their campaigns against terrorism.151  
Finally in 2008, both nations’ defense ministers met in Jakarta to expand on 
common goals such as maritime security and counterterrorism through joint exercises and 
mutually hosted military training.152 The decision was a result of the Lombok Treaty on 
Defense Cooperation signed in November 13, 2007.153 This treaty unified both nations 
on mutual efforts against terrorism, and fomented bilateral law enforcement in maritime 
affairs. This common effort has as an underlying basis the nations’ mutual respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, renewing ties which were severed after the 
Australian led mission in East Timor at the beginning of the century.  
D. ASEAN EFFORTS 
The ASEAN Special Senior Officials’ meeting held in Yogyakarta in 2004 
directed the establishment of a forum for ASEAN Defense Ministers to meet with the 
purpose of establishing objectives for the ASEAN Security Community.154 Per the 
declaration of the ASEAN Concord II of 2003 (Bali Concord II), ASEAN is a community 
comprising the principles of political/security, economic and socio-cultural 
cooperation.155 The creation of a forum focused on the enhancement of this association 
as a security community contributed to the region’s multilateral security commitment. 
This led to the development of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), a 
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mechanism designed to expand the region’s cooperation on defense and security within 
the organization and with external partners, emphasizing transparency and realizing the 
goals of the Bali Concord II.  
In May of 2006, the first ADMM was held in Kuala Lumpur Malaysia, where the 
nations’ representatives declared the establishment of the ADMM-Plus, a forum where 
ASEAN nations can address security issues with external nation partners. However, this 
dialogue emphasized ASEAN as the center and priority of the forum, focusing 
importance in the collective ASEAN interests over those of outside nations’.156 The 
member nations of ASEAN announced they would reconsider the foreign interests in the 
security of the region, placing ASEAN interests and goals at a higher priority.157 
Indonesia’s Defense Minister emphasized that foreign desires must not interfere with the 
member nations’ national security, further announcing that ASEAN would assure its own 
regional security. This Indonesian stance translates into this nation’s refusal to enter 
military pacts with foreign powers unlike Malaysia and Philippines. These latter two 
nations have already established agreements with Australia, the UK and the U.S. as 
mentioned above.  
In November of 2007, the second ADMM was held in Singapore where the 
nations’ delegates discussed regional challenges posed by terrorism and maritime threats 
in the region.158 The outcome of this meeting was the agreement on a Three Year Work 
Program which would promote multilateral security interaction based on existing 
agreements and structures, mutual trust and sharing of intelligence enhancing regional 
security, transparency and openness. The nations also committed themselves to the 
establishment of an organization’s early warning system to prevent conflicts in the 
region.159  
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have increasingly shown an interest in 
cooperating with each other to improve security in the region, particularly in the Celebes 
Sea. In Southeast Asia, more attention has been placed on the Strait of Malacca, but the 
Celebes Sea is now receiving a similar level of attention. The increasing willingness for 
the three nations to cooperate extend from their military services, to intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies, which adds depth to the security cooperation in the Celebes Sea 
and littoral areas.  
The effect of pressure from Australia and New Zealand to enhance the security of 
passages along the Celebes Sea has raised the pressure on the littoral countries to increase 
security cooperation. As international pressures and incentives have pushed these nations 
to cooperate in the security of their borders and territories, old sensitivities to interference 
in their internal affairs has limited the extent of maritime security among them. While 
Malaysia and the Philippines have shown more willingness to enter agreements with 
foreign powers, the deep historical anti colonial feelings of Indonesia may be steering 
these former colonies towards a security initiative in which regional countries, not 
outside powers like the U.S. and Australia, play the main role. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES FOR TRINATIONAL 
SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE CELEBES SEA  
The existing links and cooperation between terrorist and criminal groups of 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines pose a complex threat which these nations 
cannot resolve through unilateral efforts. These groups have proven their ability to move 
from island to island across the Celebes Sea with limited government interference. When 
Indonesian counterterrorism efforts in Java forced the JI to move their base of operations 
to other Indonesian islands such as Sulawesi, it also allowed them to conduct joint 
training and seek refuge in military camps controlled by separatist rebels in the southern 
Philippines.  
These groups have been able to evade government efforts by crossing maritime 
borders in a matter of hours. Traditional Indonesian and Malaysian resistance to allowing 
Philippine and U.S. forces to operate within their waters allows these groups to exploit 
seams in the triborder area. The inability of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines to 
maintain a permanent security posture in these remote territories through out the year 
enhances these groups’ survivability. 
Mutual mistrust among Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, domestic 
constraints that prevent these governments from engaging in closer military cooperation 
with each other and their limited force projection capabilities severely hinder effective 
security cooperation in the Celebes Sea. Historical and ongoing border disputes along 
with persistent territorial claims further deepen the trilateral mistrust among these 
nations. This provides the advantage to terrorist and criminal groups, which are able to 
engage in effective transnational cooperation. However, these mutual frictions become 
less relevant as foreign nations increase their pressures on the three nations to secure 
critical maritime passages such as the Makassar Strait and the Celebes Sea.  
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Australia, New Zealand, and the United States among other external powers have 
increased their interest and have successfully cemented security and defense agreements 
with the three nations. This increasing foreign security presence has interfered with the 
sense of regionalism among these nations. These foreign nation approaches and following 
extra-regional diplomatic achievements have violated the underlying ASEAN principles 
of non interference, prompting Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines to reconsider 
their external ties and focus on trilateral cooperation as stated during the ADMM meeting 
of 2006 held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
This renewed trinational drive has allowed Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines to take necessary steps towards further cooperation, including the acceptance 
of joint operation proposals within their national borders despite previously mentioned 
obstacles. However, these initiatives have lacked adequate depth, as they have been 
subject to trinational disadvantages due to several institutional and force projection 
challenges. This gap can be successfully filled by foreign governments’ assistance to 
domestic civilian law enforcement, intelligence agencies and the military. Assistance can 
be in the form of training, equipment sales and logistics infrastructure development. This 
new approach would place foreign nations in a supporting role, while Indonesia, 
Malaysia and the Philippines maintain a leading role in securing the Celebes Sea 
triborder area.   
B. RECOMMENDED U.S. POLICY TO ENHANCE TRINATIONAL 
SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE CELEBES SEA 
U.S. policy in the region has a reputation of short commitment which obliges 
these nations to be flexible when dealing with foreign powers and their influences in 
Southeast Asia. The delayed reaction of the U.S. and the unpopular measures of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 left a 
bitter taste in the affected nations, reinforcing the belief that U.S. commitment cannot be 
counted on when mostly needed. This is further complicated by the diverse regional 
reactions toward the American presence. While the Philippines has become more 
welcoming since the late 1990s, Indonesia’s willingness to accept a U.S. presence in its 
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waters and territory is very low. During Operation Unified Assistance (in response to the 
Tsunami in December 2004), the U.S. was not able to maintain troops overnight in 
Indonesian territory as a result of this nation’s mistrust of American intentions. The 
present American commitment in Afghanistan and Iraq further implies to these nations 
that our attention is somewhere else. 
American policy in the Middle East, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
the aforementioned engagements are closely observed by the governments and Muslim 
populations in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Even though the governments of 
Indonesia and Malaysia urge their fellow Muslim states to emphasize economic growth 
instead of radical Islamic ideology, these same governments are highly critical of the 
U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Closer to the region is the American support 
of the Philippine government in its Mindanao and Sulu campaigns, which share a 
common history and religion with Indonesia and Malaysia.  
Indonesia and Malaysia pay close attention to the manner in which the U.S. 
provides this support and the way the Philippines handles the Mindanao and Sulu 
situation. Common sentiment and impression among these Muslim populations is that the 
U.S. intends to weaken the Muslim world, and this presents a serious obstacle to 
American policy in Southeast Asia. Even though U.S. assistance during the tsunami 
along with the current running television advertisements with pro-American sentiments 
may have improved Indonesian public opinion toward the U.S., further engagement is 
necessary to transform this nation’s colonial-origin adversity and mistrust towards 
foreign powers.160 Further U.S. civil-military cooperation in the Philippines contributes 
to its government presence in remote territories, reducing insurgency and separatist 
support which may incline the government and the population of Indonesia and Malaysia 
to favor American military presence. 
As previously mentioned, these nations are very sensitive when dealing with their 
territorial integrity and sense of sovereignty, therefore U.S. policy must abide by these 
principles if success is desired. Earlier chapters discussed examples of agreements with 
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foreign powers which seemed to have more extensive results than those reached among 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Using this pattern, U.S. policy should be 
designed to support indigenous trilateral security cooperation in the Celebes Sea, instead 
of leading it. Continuous military and civilian agency bi/multilateral exercises allow 
partnership and trust to solidify while contributing to the security of these nations.  
U.S. policy toward Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines should be focused 
primarily in providing training to increase the expertise of these nations’ armed forces in 
counterinsurgency, maritime interdiction, and security and stability operations. The U.S. 
military and domestic law enforcement agencies are crucial for the development of 
necessary capabilities in these nations. This training should not be exclusive to the 
military forces, but extended to their civilian law enforcement agencies, which are more 
often engaged in these types of operations. Civil-military trilateral exercises and 
cooperation allows cross border contacts and relationships to develop, bridging across 
decades of mistrust and rivalries. 
The U.S. and international respect of these nations’ sovereignty and national 
integrity, the reduction of respective domestic constraints to trilateral cooperation and the 
assistance to develop well equipped, trained and efficient military and domestic law 
enforcement agencies will pave the way for the needed trilateral security cooperation in 
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